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INTERPRETIVE THEORY IN ITS INFANCY:
A REPLY TO POSNER
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule

I.

INTRODUCTION

In law, problems of interpretation can be explored at different
levels of generality. At the most specific level, people might urge that

the Equal Protection Clause forbids affirmative action, or that the
Food and Drug Act applies to tobacco products. At a higher level of
generality, people might argue that the Equal Protection Clause
should be interpreted in accordance with the original understanding of
its ratifiers, or that the meaning of the Food and Drug Act should be
settled with careful attention to its legislative history. At a still higher
level of generality, people might identify the considerations that bear
on the selection of one or another approach to interpretation, with or
without reaching a conclusion about the appropriate approach.
In Interpretation and Institutions, we proceed at the highest level of
generality, without offering final judgments about our preferred ap
proach or about particular cases.1 Our principal submission is that any

judgment about the preferred approach must pay a great deal of atten
tion to institutional capacities and dynamic effects. We intend this

submission as a constructive one - one that helps clarify the grounds
for reasonable disagreement and that suggests the possibility of em
pirical research that might actually be helpful. In our view, the study
of legal interpretation remains in its infancy, and we are confident that
in part as a result of such research, the legal culture will know a great
deal more in twenty years than it knows today.2 In emphasizing the
importance of attending to institutional capacities and dynamic effects,
we presented a survey, illustrative rather than exhaustive, of a wide
range of work that seems to us to have neglected those capacities and
1. We hope that this point will clarify a number of Posner's misunderstandings. For
example, we do not "deplore" what Posner calls "[t]he 'outrage' test for unconstitutionality."
See Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Stattttory and Constit11tional
Interpretation. 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 963 (2003) [hereinafter Posner, Reply]. And because
our focus is not on particular results, Posner's claims of inconsistency between Sunstein's
prior work and what is said here are at best overstated.

2. Exhibit No. J: A first-year law student recently asked one of the current authors:
"Can you refer me to studies of different interpretive practices in different states, and of
whether state legislatures are acting differently in responses to those different practices?"
The student was amazed to hear that there are no such studies, putting aside a small number
of case studies and anecdotal reports.
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those effects. We also attempted to identify some empirical questions
that might cast light on the underlying issues.
We are grateful to Judge Posner for his spirited and lengthy reply.
But his disagreements with us are minor - more rhetorical than real.
In a department (not a law school) of a well-known university, senior

faculty members are said to respond to new ideas in one of two ways.

(a) "We did that." (b) "We never did that." Posner's reply has some of

this flavor.
Posner has misunderstood our views in at least three respects.
First, Posner takes us to "praise ... judicial formalism."3 As we stated,
our twofold project is to argue that the choice between formalism and
antiformalism must be made on institutional and empirical grounds,
rather than conceptual or linguistic grounds, and also to describe the
conditions under which f ormalism or antiformalism would be the
better choice f or particular institutions or societies.4 One of us

(Vermeule) indeed believes that current American law should become
more formalist, but it is not our concern here to make the arguments
on formalism's behalf.5 The large stretches of Posner's discussion that
challenge interpretive formalism, then, are irrelevant to our claims.
Second, Posner accuses us of understating the extent to which past
work has viewed interpretation through an institutional lens. We
cannot imagine that Posner has any real disagreement with our central
claim, which is that most such work is insufficiently resolute about the
institutional approach. To be sure, a great deal of interpretive scholar
ship talks about legislatures, agencies and courts; how could it be
otherwise? Of course our claim is not that we are the first to connect
institutions to interpretation. In our view, however, most interpretive
theorizing goes wrong either by adopting a stylized and nonempirical
account of institutional capacities, or by adopting an asymmetrical
account that views one type of institution, usually legislatures, through
a realist lens, while viewing others, usually courts, in utopian terms.
Posner does not engage these claims, challenging instead a view that
we do not hold and that we agree to be ludicrous.
Third, Posner says that we deny the inevitability of casual empiri
cism in interpretive theory and in law generally, while failing to
propose feasible empirical work ourselves. Perhaps we were insuffi
ciently clear, but we agree that casual empiricism is inevitable. Indeed

3. Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 952.
4. Posner's claims about how a "literalist" would interpret the Constitution, see id. at
962-63, raise many complexities. The most obvious of these is that in most of the cases he
discusses, the relevant provisions are ambiguous. and no literal meaning requires the results
he describes. For example, the Equal Protection Clause literally requires equal protection,
but without more specification. that requirement does not require, permit, or forbid affirma
tive action.
5. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice. 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000).
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we would go further: in the absence of empirical knowledge, people
need to rely on presumptions, rules of thumb, and other techniques
that help produce decisions in the face of uncertainty.6 But the inevi
tability of casual empiricism, in areas where little is yet known, doesn't

mean we can't simultaneously try to find out more; casual and formal
empiricism are not mutually exclusive, as Posner seems to assume. In
any case, we have tried to suggest a number of empirical projects, just
one of them involving an understanding of the performance of state
courts.

In the remainder of this Reply, we investigate two of Posner's
objections in greater detail, simply because an investigation of those

objections might clarify our basic claims. The first objection involves

different types of institutional blindness. The second involves the
feasibility and usefulness of empirical work, especially in light of the
apparent difficulty of evaluating empirical findings without antecedent
agreement on what constitutes a correct or incorrect interpretation.
II.

BLINDNESSES

Our article identified three types of institutional blindness. We

might describe the three types along the following lines.

(1) Out-and-out Philosophizing.
These are theorists who attempt to derive an account of interpreta
tion from resolutely noninstitutional premises, particularly high-level
political concepts like "democracy" and "authority," or abstrac
tions about the character of language. Posner is right to say that
philosopher-lawyers like Dworkin are the paradigm example here.
Posner says that these philosopher-lawyers aren't trying to answer all

the relevant questions at once; they're focusing on first-best questions,

leaving institutional considerations for other scholars. But to this point
he also supplies the right rebuttal: doing a partial analysis is valuable,

but it isn't possible to use that analysis to derive conclusions about

specific interpretive doctrines and outcomes, absent any account of
the institutional considerations that always intervene between abstract
premises and concrete conclusions.
So far, so good. The trouble is that Posner suggests, incorrectly,
that this is our charge against all interpretive theory. We agree that
many previous accounts have considered institutional ideas in some
fashion or other. But in addition to ignoring institutional considera
tions entirely, there are other ways in which interpretive theories go
wrong. Most accounts of interpretation have stumbled into additional
pitfalls.

6. See id.
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(2) Stylized Institutionalism.
Here the interpretive theorist talks about comparative institutional

competence, but in a stylized or stereotyped way, on the basis of ab
stract visions of "legislatures" and "courts." This is our understanding
of Hart and Sacks: the talk is of institutions, but the institutions are

pictured in fuzzy, and excessively laudatory, ways that correspond only
hazily to the realities of American government. (As explained below,
we fear that Posner may be making the same mistake when he de
scribes American appellate courts as councils of "wise elders,"7 except

that Posner is not as charitable to legislatures as were Hart and Sacks.)
(3) A symmetrical Institutionalism.

Here the characteristic mistake is to take a cynical or pessimistic

view of some institutions and a unjustifiably rosy view of others. In
constitutional law, John Hart Ely's "process" theory,8 in which far
sighted and politically responsible courts police invidious stereotyping
and other process failures on the part of dysfunctional legislatures, is
an exemplar. Ely's theory is attractive to many; but what if courts are
unwilling to do what Ely urges, and what if courts would fail to do the
task well if they tried? Much of public choice theory is similar, albeit
with a different diagnosis of process failure - one that sees inefficient
rent seeking by legislators and interest groups, rather than racial dis

crimination, as the principal danger that the process-policing judiciary
is to prevent.9 (Eskridge, by the way, seems to us to make the same
mistake, albeit with slightly different emphases.) Posner taxes us for
not mentioning process theory or public choice, but he seems not to

realize that asymmetrical accounts of this sort can't be taken very
seriously anymore, at least not as offering complete support for any
view of interpretation. Treatments by Komesar, Elhauge, and others

have demonstrated, in different but compatible ways, the inability of
asymmetrical institutionalism to underwrite plausible conclusions
about constitutional and statutory interpretation.10
We may summarize our overview of interpretive theory by saying
that we argue for an institutionalism that is evenhandedly empirical an institutional account that is realistic about the capacities of all rele
vant actors. Our challenge to interpretive theories past and present,
then, is not the absurdly sweeping claim that Judge Posner attributes

7. See Posner, Reply, supra note 1, at 959.
8. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REVIEW (1980).
9. For overviews and selections from this literature, see DANIEL FARBER & PHILIPP.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); MAXWELL
STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW ( 1997).
to. For a discussion of these scholars and their work, see Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Verrneule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 937 (2003) (hereinafter
Sunstein & Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions].
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to us, to the effect that institutional issues are generally or universally
ignored.
As for Posner's own work on interpretation: to date, he himself has

fallen firmly into the third category, that of ·asymmetrical institution
alism, because he holds a persistently jaundiced picture of legislative

and administrative capacities and a persistently celebratory view of
(other) appellate judges. Consider Posner's amusing vision of

American appellate courts as councils of "wise elders."11 (Does this
apply to state appellate courts, say the Rhode Island intermediate
courts, as well as to the Seventh Circuit?) Posner says that this vision
rests on "institutional factors."12 So it does, in part, but the qualifier is

crucial: the only factors Posner's partial analysis considers are charac
teristics of judges that happen to support a benign view of judicial
capacities. Here is Posner's discussion:

Judges of the higher American courts are generally picked from the
upper tail of the population distribution in terms of age, education, intel
ligence, disinterest, and sobriety. They are not tops in all these depart
ments but they are well above average, at least in the federal courts be

cause of the elaborate preappointment screening of candidates for
federal judgeships. Judges are schooled in a profession that sets a high
value on listening to both sides of an issue before making up one's mind,

on sifting truth from falsehood, and on exercising a detached judgment.
Their decisions are anchored in the facts of concrete disputes between
real people. Members of the legal profession have played a central role
in the political history of the United States, and the profession's institu

tions and usages are reflectors of the fundamental political values that

have emerged from that history. Appellate judges in nonroutine cases
are expected to express as best they can the reasons for their decisions in
signed, public documents (the published decisions of these courts) and
this practice creates accountability and fosters a certain reflectiveness
and self-discipline.'3

Revealingly absent from this account, however, is the requisite
comparison of these factors to the characteristics of legislators (or for
that matter agency officials). Legislators are also picked from the
upper tail of the population distribution on all the measures Posner
mentions, and if they are not so detached as judges they have much
better information about real-world consequences than judges do. A
whiff of guild interest hangs about Posner's· discussion when he says
that "[m]embers of the legal profession have played a central role in
the political history of the United States, and the profession's institu-

11. Posner. Reply, supra note 1. at 959.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 959 n.33 (quoting Richard A. Posner. Pragmatic Adjudication. in THE
REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 235.
243-44 (Morris Dickstein ed.. 1998) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication]) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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tions and usages are reflectors of the fundamental political values that
have emerged from that history."14 We would be surprised if Posner
really believes that lawy�rs, as a class, have unique insight into the
nation's fundamental political and moral values. And in any event

legislators are often lawyers as well. Posner urges that we simply
"disagree" with his assessment of institutional capacities. Not so. The
point of disagreement is that we think his assessment fails, not because
it is substantively erroneous {we are agnostic about that), but instead

because it neglects to provide a full comparative assessment of the
relevant institutional factors.
III. ANTECEDENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE

Posner briefly suggests that our proposal for empirical investiga
tions, attempting to identify mistakes and injustices, "is a nonstarter
unless there is some objective method of determining whieh decisions
are mistaken or unjust."15 We are more optimistic. In some cases,
people who disagree on the "objective method," or at least the right
method, might be able to agree that one or another result counts as
mistaken or unjust. Imagine, for example, a jurisdiction in which liter
alist interpretations produced outcomes· that no reasonable person
could endorse, and in which the relevant legislature could not antici
pate those outcomes in advance or correct them after they occurred.
In such a jurisdiction, the case for absurdity-·avoiding nonliteral inter
pretations, at least in compelling circumstances, would be very
strong.16 Nor is the example fanciful: Is it irrelevant, in this regard, that
in the United States (and many other nations as well), there seems to
·

be a consensus in favor of interpreting statutes nonliterally in the case
of obvious drafting errors?17
Posner doesn't like all of our proposals for empirical work. He
suggests research projects that he would prefer. But we continue to
believe that it would be revealing and informative to know whether
courts are especially literalist in areas in which Congress is engaged in
more aggressive oversight of judicial decisions. If this is so, literalism
would be well-matched to congressional attentiveness. We also think it
eminently feasible, and potentially valuable, to compare the interpre
tive practices of the various states, to have a better sense of what

l4. Id. (quoting Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, supra note 13, at 235, 243-44) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 966.
16. Hence this is the short answer to the final question on Judge Posner's list of
questions. See id. at 970-71. All of the questions are interesting and important, but the sixth
is the only that directly bears on our claims. See id. at 971.
17. For more detailed discussion. see Sunstein
lnstiflltions. supra note lO.

&

Vermeule, Interpretation and
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judges are actually doing. We agree that rigorous empirical studies
present a daunting challenge; the empirical study of law remains in its
infancy.18 (We confess that we are not terribly excited about Posner's

suggestion that academics should study the relationship between state
legislative activity and judicial salaries. To each his own!)
But our major goal is not to set out a formal empirical agenda of
any kind. We urge that large-scale conceptual claims cannot settle
current disputes about interpretation; that any claims about interpre
tation are incomplete if they ignore institutional considerations; and
that an understanding of those considerations helps explain what,

exactly, reasonable people are currently disagreeing about. We do not
take Posner to have challenged any of these claims. Indeed, he has
given further reasons to accept all of them. We might be having a
debate. But we do not believe that we are having a disagreement.

18. Of course, many law professors are not trained to do empirical work, but this is
changing. We have referred to William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Stattttory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).

